Keywords: "Critical Race Theory", discrimination, race, "ethnic origins", Swedish Labour Court, Sweden When enacting the most recent Discrimination Act (2008), the Swedish legislator deliberately removed the term "race" from the list of unlawful discrimination grounds. According to the legislative preparatory works to the act, this was to demonstrate that a biological concept of race is unacceptable: " [T]here is no scientific basis for dividing human beings into different races and from a biological perspective, consequently is there neither any reason to use the word race with respect to human beings."
in 1979, 4 and race, color, nationality or ethnic origins initially in 1986. 5 Protections against direct discrimination/disparate treatment can be seen as the first generation of legal protection as to discriminatory behavior, banning explicit requirements based on any of these grounds, for example, prohibiting signs by employers stating that "Blacks need not apply" or "Gypsies not welcome." Indirect discrimination/disparate impact often comprises structural discrimination as recognized already by the United States Supreme Court in Griggs. One of the primary focuses of the theories examined here is this very structural discrimination, seen as a main source of the discriminatory behavior persisting to the present date. Institutions and institutional rulesnot simply customs, ideas, attitudes, culture, or private behavior-are viewed as shaping race the basis of sexual orientation, but certain states have adopted such legislation, see for example: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia. A few states have laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination only in public workplaces: Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania. 4 Lag (SFS 1979 (SFS :1118 om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet ("1979 Equal Treatment Act") . This act was eventually replaced by the 1991 Equality Act, Jämställdhetslag (SFS 1991:433) (SFS 1986:442) mot etnisk diskriminering. This act was replaced in 1994 by an act of the same name, Lag (SFS 1994 :134) mot etnisk diskriminering, and then again in 1999 , Lag (SFS 1999 , when workplace tests disparately impact ethnic minority employees, businesses must prove that the tests are consistent with business necessity and "reasonably related" to the jobs for which the tests are required). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to prohibit private discrimination in the lease and sale of property). 7 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions ("Equal Treatment Directive"), OJ 1976 L 39/40, Celex No. 31976L0207. 8 Lag (SFS 2000:773) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (SFS 1991:433) , Prop. 1999 /2000 :143 Ändringar i jämställdhetslagen m.m., Bet. 2000 /01:AU3, Rskr. 2000 A new act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or religion was also passed in 1999, lag (SFS 1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet. These 1999 statutes were modeled on the 1991 Equal Treatment Between Women and Men Act.
relations. 9 As institutional rules, the role of the law has been seen as a pivotal force in both fighting against such structural discrimination as well as cementing race relations and preventing progress for minorities.
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Part One: The Legal Theoretical Frameworks for Race
Originating in Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), and parallel to the developments in feminist legal theory, race became a focus of several legal theories beginning in the 1970's, including
Critical Race Theory, Post-Colonialism 11 and later Intersectionality. Each of these outsider critical theories (outcrits) shares the basic premise of treating individuals as the subjects of the theory as opposed to theoretical objects. The use of the term "subject" is, however, problematic in itself as pointed out by Foucault: "There are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to." 12 Recognizing and legitimating the experiences of the individual is seen by these theories as a step towards coming to terms with the historical treatment of certain groups, finding atonement/resolution, as well as creating a tool for combating discrimination.
I. The Origins of Critical Race Theory
Critical Race Theory (CRT or Race Crits) has its historical roots in the late 1970's, emerging as a new strategy for dealing with the post-civil rights racial structure in the United States.
This structure was argued to be maintained by a colorblind ideology that hid and protected white privilege, while masking racism within the rhetoric of "meritocracy" and "fairness."
CRT emerged within this historical context as a framework aimed at undermining colorblind 9 J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (1999) at 1. 10 For the American context, see Martha R. Mahoney, What's Left of Solidarity? Reflections on Law, Race, and Labor History, 57 Buff.L.Rev. 1515 (2009) . Mahoney argues that the dual developments in the case law rendered class-based interracial organizing difficult in labor history by making it difficult for workers to organize and strike and preventing states from giving workers effective protection in joining unions and for legislators to enact labor-protective regulation combined with cases limiting or striking down Reconstruction civil rights statutes that should have protected equality. According to Mahoney, this fostered racial division, promoted insecurity among workers, and placed burdens on class-based organizing. 14 Law students also played a pivotal role in the development of CRT as pointed out by Delgado, who concludes his article by stating: "A short, final Section draws lessons from the foregoing. One message, hopeful in nature, is, simply, that it is hard to kill an idea. A related insight holds that, as much as the establishment might wish to confine education to that which it finds useful, it cannot, in the end, do so. A 'theory of surplus education'--a correlate of Marx's famous proposition --holds that if you teach a worker enough mathematics to use a machine or operate a cash register, he will use that knowledge to figure out that you are raking off a great deal of profit and ask for a raise. If you teach Chicano children to read well enough that they can follow the directions on a bag of fertilizer or pesticide, they may also read the rest of the label, including the health warnings, and may one day get a lawyer and file a class action against you for personal injury. If you teach grade-school students the revolutionary ideals that led to the Boston Tea Party, you may find them using that same rhetoric against you if you have been tyrannizing them in the classroom. analyze data and build theory as collaborators in the research process.
5.
The transdisciplinary perspective. CRT also utilizes the transdisciplinary knowledge and the methodological base of ethnic studies, women's studies, sociology, history, and the law in constructing its theoretical premise. This is important to the research process because it offers the critical-race researcher an array of research methodologies to consider, especially those methodologies that have developed in an attempt to capture and understand the experiences of marginalized communities better than more traditional research methods.
Two things are vitally important to understand when approaching CRT. The first is that this school of legal theory is not fixed but fluid, and purposefully so. CRT scholars can be seen to have agreed to disagree as to the content and course of this school of legal thought. Much as with CLS, this lack of a fixed content is perceived by CRT scholars mostly as a strength, and less often at times as a weakness, leading to both internal and external criticism.
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III. Race and Racialization
The second pivotal issue within a CRT framework is that the use of the term "race" in no way refers to any biological understanding of race. Instead, much as the use of gender, it refers to a social construct: "Race is not ... simply a matter of physical appearance and ancestry ...
. [I]t is
primarily a function of the meaning given to these." 29 Although race is neither truly biologically or scientifically significant, this does not weaken the power of the construction as summarized by one scholar:
As a result, I start with the assumption that race and the "one drop of blood" rule are not based on any established scientific or biological definition. Of course, that does not mean race has no meaning or power in our society. Quite the contrary, race is an intractable force in American society touching every facet of day-to-day American life--often affecting where one goes to school, the job opportunities presented, who one marries, where one lives, the health care one receives, and even where one is interred following death. Race, in other words, continues to matter in our society, whether its definitional base is scientific or not. In fact, race has become a more powerful factor in American society because of its social construction. In sum, race, albeit socially constructed, continues to matter dearly in American society.
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Studies have shown that people continue to make decisions based upon race and proxies for race, such as African-sounding names, to discriminate in employment and housing.
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Given the premise that race is a social construct, groups of individuals who are not necessarily of the same ethnic origins can be "racialized" by society. Here race is used as a verb to convey the notion that racialization or using race and its attendant meanings as part of a system of assignment is an active and intentional process. 32 Groups that have experienced racialization include Asians, Muslims and Arabs.
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IV. CRT spin-offs
Dissatisfaction with the original focus of CRT on the situation of African-Americans led to a wave of spin-off movements within CRT such as Critical Race Feminism, Latino and Latina
Critical Schools (LatCrit), Asian American Legal Scholarship and ClassCrits. 34 Though only briefly discussed below, it is apparent that these spin-offs have paved the way to an intersectionality analysis. Critical Race Feminism can be seen as breaking ground for a concept of intersectionality.
Critical Race Feminism
Critical Race Feminism brought forth the idea that race was too one-dimensional an analysis, based on a single axis framework of the experience of African-American men. 35 This theory has been successfully argued so that under American federal discrimination law, African
American women are judicially recognized as a protected class. 36 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed it:
In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide protection against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate and distinct from the class of women and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result which leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.
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The court went on to find that this result was mandated by the holdings of the Supreme
Court and its own case law in the "sex-plus" cases. 'n, 615 F.2d 1025 'n, 615 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980 at 1032. In the case, plaintiff, an African-American female, applied for one of two positions as a field representative. The positions were previously staffed by a white female and an African-American male. On the day she submitted her application, Jefferies noticed that a "personnel action" had been completed to hire Eddie Jones, an AfricanAmerican male, as acting field representative. Jefferies filed a lawsuit alleging race and sex discrimination. During the trial, Jefferies submitted uncontroverted evidence that every position for which she applied had been filled by males or white females. 38 The reference to the sex plus cases is in part to the Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.¸ 400 U.S. 542 (1971) in which the Court accepted the theory of sex plus. In Phillips, plaintiff was denied employment by the defendant because she had pre-school-age children. However, defendant employed men with pre-school-age children. The district court granted a motion to strike the portion of the complaint which alleged that discrimination against females with pre-school-age children violated Title VII. The district court subsequently granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because 75 to 80 percent of the positions in question were held by females; thus, sex discrimination could not have occurred. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision. The Fifth Circuit stated:
We are of the opinion that the words of the statute are the best source from which to derive the proper construction. The statute proscribes discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. A per se violation of the Act can only be discrimination based solely on one of the categories, i.e., in the case of sex: women vis-a-vis men. When another criterion of employment is added to one of the classifications listed in the Act, there is no longer apparent discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It becomes the function of the courts to study the conditioning of employment on one of the elements outlined in the statute coupled with the additional requirement, and to determine if any individual or group is being denied work due to his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
category.
Latino and Latina Critical Schools
The Latina/o Critical Race Theory (LatCrit) employs CRT to examine the particular ways World War II. Yet the existing architecture of domestic and international anti-discrimination law has avoided recognizing racial discrimination based on religious group difference.
Domestic and international law simultaneously creates and obscures current "Muslim" racial identity. The most overt and publicly debated of law's methods in this regard is so-called racial profiling. Equally critical, however, is the incompleteness of legal remedies available to those targeted by religiously driven racial discrimination. Thus by both its commissions and omissions, law is implicated in this process of religioning race.
47
The racialization of religion can be seen as a now established arena for CRT.
VI. Intersectionality
Kimberlé Crenshaw expanded Critical Race Theory to Critical Race Feminism to a theory of Intersectionality. 48 Intersectionality facilitates a focus on individuals whose subject-positions are formed by multiple and hybrid interests, such as through the lens of race, gender, class, religion and age. It is seen as "the interplay between individual versus structural sources of equality as well as the mutual construction of racism with other forms of "isms," such as class-based oppression, gender-based oppression, and other inequalities based on religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, and so on--what is sometimes called intersectionality or simultaneity." 49 Intersectionality argues that without "a deep understanding that each of these axes of injustice are part and parcel of an overall system and structure of power, in which some groups are systematically favored and others disfavored, any efforts at social change will only end up repeating the hierarchies but in slightly disguised ways."
VII. A Post-Race Approach
A part of the discourse as to discrimination today in both the United States and Europe is the avoidance of the word "race" as being outdated and no longer valid in today's world, a reasoning that can termed post-racialism. 50 District No. 1, that "the way 'to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis' is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." As Professor john powell notes, statements like this, which are frequently made by post-racialists, espouse a "false universalism"--a belief that every person is equal and requires no state-provided advantage. 51 At the same time, being post-racial eliminates the need for policies addressing the continuing legacy of a racist past. In contemporary society, being post-racial means that there is no longer a need for affirmative action or other race-based remedies. If society is postracial, then race-based remedies are undesirable as a lingering remnant of less enlightened times. Affirmative action programs or other race-conscious remedies are, by definition, inconsistent with a post-racial "reality." Post-racialism in its current form can be seen as an ideology reflecting a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies.
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Although post-racialism may be a panacea for those with racial fatigue, it also evinces a type of racial amnesia--a desire to forget that those marked by race neither asked for the designation nor can they escape its present day meanings and effects.
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Part Two: Race in Swedish Law
Sweden has had a long history with the term "race" that can be traced back to one of 57 The status of the European Convention in Swedish law during this first phase was uncertain, as the issue of whether Sweden had a monistic or dualistic system with respect to international obligations was not clear. Two cases presenting claims under the European Convention were decided by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court in 1973 and 1974 , respectively. See NJA 1973 p. 423 and RÅ 1974 . These judgments, referred to as the "transformation judgments", established the principle that foreign treaties had to be incorporated or transformed into Swedish law before Swedish citizens could cite them as a direct basis for a 
II. Swedish Constitutional Protections as to Unlawful Racial Discrimination
The Instrument of Government adopted in 1974 to replace that of 1809 was to embody the constitutional changes that had successively occurred during the interim. The failure of the 1809 Instrument of Government to reflect the political reality, and the marginalization of the outdated Instrument of Government, is seen as giving rise to a sort of anti-constitutionalism.
The constitution did not and should not reign in popular sovereignty. A second departure consciously taken from the 1809 Instrument of Government was the decision to change the balance of political power from that of separation of power to a separation of function.
Parliament is to be the sole legislator as seen from the portal paragraph of the 1974 Instrument of Government: "All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people." As a result, a comparatively weak court system was created with only limited powers of constitutional review. This is also clear from the fact that the third branch of political power, after the legislative and executive branches, is generally not perceived of as the judicial branch in Sweden, but rather the press. The courts were not given a power of judicial review, simply the possibility in the case at hand to declare a law in violation of the constitution. If an act of remedy. Incorporation entails that the international treaty or convention itself has to be enacted as Swedish legislation, while transformation entails that the Parliament in some fashion, either translates the document into Swedish or reformulates it to better-fit Swedish law. There is no rule as to which of these two procedures is to be applied at any given point, with the Parliament making that decision. The courts ultimately determined that Sweden had a dualistic system and consequently, individuals could not raise claims under the Convention until it was incorporated as Swedish law in 1995, effective 1998. 58 parliament or a government regulation, a higher threshold is required, with a court being able to declare it to be so only if manifestly not in compliance with the constitution.
Within this focus on majoritarianism, the very first draft of the 1974 Instrument of Government included no individual. After a general outcry, the next draft including a chapter on individual rights was adopted in 1974. These individual rights comprised only of five articles, concerning freedom of speech, expression, assembly, demonstration, association, religion and movement, as well as the right to information, protection from forced disclosures as to associations or religion, protection from unlawful searches of person, home or correspondence, access to public documents and the right for the social partners to take lawful industrial actions.
The chapter two rights were expanded already in 1976, including the addition of Article 15 stating that no law or other type of legal provision can entail that a citizen is treated less favorably on the basis of race, color or ethnic origin. The role of the rights as cataloged in chapter two, however, was still greatly debated in certain circles. Those legal scholars in favor of a weak judicial system argued that chapter two rights should be more of a policy declaration as were certain of the rights in chapter one, and not be meant to serve as a legal basis for a remedy. Instead, they should more be meant to serve as guidelines for the Parliament in its legislative work, giving precedence to the principles of parliamentary rule and popular sovereignty. These different views are reflected in the legislative preparatory documents for the 1974 constitution 59 and 1976 amendments. 60 The emphasis in the second chapter as to limiting the rights therein contained and the categorization of the rights as absolute or qualified rights was part of the compromise finally reached. Absolute rights can only be limited by the Instrument of Government, while qualified rights can be limited through legislation. In addition, a distinction is made in the Instrument of Government as to those rights accruing to Swedish citizens, and those to non-Swedish citizens.
III. Swedish Ethnic Discrimination Legislation
A first legislative act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ethnic origins was passed in 1986. 61 Statutory protection against unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, nationality or ethnic origins was initially legislated in 1986, however, no statutory sanctions were enacted, which under Swedish law means that no sanctions can be assessed by the Österåker Municipality (plaintiff, of Greek descent, applied for job as system engineer, was not discriminated against by the municipality for not being called to an interview as plaintiff requested too high wages, SEK 27 000 per month as opposed to the hired candidate's SEK 20 000) and AD 1998 no. 134, DO v. Otto Farkas Bilskadeverkstad Inc. in Växjö (plaintiff was as qualified as the candidate hired, but offered no proof of discriminatory action by defendant despite DO's allegations that the defendant did not evaluate the qualifications in the same manner nor in compliance with industry practice, nor asked the same questions nor gave the same opportunity to answer). 64 Lag (1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet. 65 An English translation of the 2008 Discrimination Act can be found at the website of the Equality Ombudsman of Sweden ("DO") at www.do.se. The current DO was created in 2009, prior to that, reference to DO is prior Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination.
word race with respect to human beings. Against this background, and as the use of the word "race" in legislative text risks inflaming prejudices, the Parliament has stated that the Government is to act in part in the international arena towards that the word "race", as used with respect to human beings, is to as great a degree as possible be avoided in official texts, and also in part to review to which extent the term "race" occurs in Swedish laws not based on international texts, and as far as possible, suggest a different definition. 
IV. Claims of Unlawful Ethnic Discrimination in Employment
Claims of unlawful discrimination in employment are ultimately brought to the Labour Court.
If the social partners are parties to the lawsuit, the case is brought directly to the Labour Court, which then acts as the first and final instance in one hearing. If the case is brought by an employee, it is first brought to the general courts and then an appeal can be made to the In contrast, the Labour Court has found that employers have had a number of "non- to an interview was not discrimination even though plaintiff was theoretically as qualified as those called, as he had less practical experience according to the defendant's assessment.
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That a plaintiff from Kosovo was not hired by the defendant municipality for the position of building permit architect because of deficient Swedish was not discrimination despite the fact that plaintiff had received a university degree from a Swedish university and later received the same position with a different municipality. 70 The fact that plaintiff submitted an employment application within the deadline set by the job advertisement, but defendant hired another Swedish candidate prior to the deadline, was not discrimination. 71 Where plaintiff of Iranian background had applied for a job as pre-school teacher via fax, the Labour Court found it doubtful that the school had received the application as it claimed it did not, as the school would have been eligible for more funding if they had hired any person for the position, thus there was no motive for the school to discriminate. Mohammed" and that she was used to seeing people from all corners of the world. The defendant employer admitted that the employee had said these things to the plaintiff, but that the woman had already hired someone else just seconds before the interview and felt she could not inform the plaintiff of this. Accepting this as the course of events, the Labour Court found that there was no discrimination as the position (a temporary position demonstrating food products) had already been filled.
In the cases that have been brought in the past two years, the Labour Court has stated that the employer did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of ethnic origins as the candidate had included only a telephone number, and had not included her home address or her age.
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Despite the fact that the employer hired three ethnic Swedish candidates with equivalent discriminated against though she was qualified for the job and employer defendant knew she was of a minority during the job interview, question was whether a representative of the employer informed plaintiff during the interview that she would not receive the job because of her skin color after singing "Hallelujah" during the interview. The Labour Court found that the person committing these acts at the interview was not a representative of the company June 2006 after the union became involved. He was forced to stay home for 37 days and then transferred to another work place. The municipality alleged that it did not know that plaintiff had felt discriminated against so that it had no duty to investigate. The municipality also alleged that the letter written by plaintiff was threatening and that Andersson knew that something needed to be done at the work place.
The Labour Court began with the statements made by the unit head, Andersson, finding it strange that if she had made such statements often, that none of the other employees had heard them, thus DO had not met the burden of proof with respect to them. As to the other employees calling plaintiff names such as "Big Black Bastard", "Black Head", "The African", "Kunta Kinte" and "gangsta", the Labour Court again found that none of the other employees had heard such and thus the behavior was not proven. However, there was banter at the workplace, including the use of nicknames such as "Blackey", to which plaintiff responded at times with "Whitey." The Labour Court found that as plaintiff had participated in this banter, the employer had no reason to believe that it was inappropriate and discriminatory, and as such, no duty to investigate. The Labour Court did assess damages due to the employer's failure to involve the union with respect to the order to stay home from work.
The second victory with respect to claims of ethnic discrimination is also the most recent one addressed by the Labour Court. In the case, two women, one originally from Bosnia and the other from the former Soviet Union, were in the employ of a municipality. They were subjected to both sexual and ethnic harassment by their group leader, who eventually was promoted up to unit leader. The group leader referred to them as "Eastern girls" instead of by name, and put a sexually graphic picture up in the personnel lunch room as Christmas greetings two years in a row, 2006 and 2007. The leader was promoted to a management position in the municipality, no longer directly the women's boss, and in 2008 he emailed the picture to them as a Christmas greeting. The women had informed the man that they found the behavior offensive. Finally the two women filed complaints with the municipality and the Discrimination Ombudsman, as well as reported him to the police. The court found the municipality liable to pay damages for the sexual and ethnic harassment in the amount of SEK 35,000 (app. € 3,800) to one of the plaintiffs, but that only sexual harassment was proven with respect to the other plaintiff with damages set at SEK 25,000 (app. € 2,700).
However, the divided court ordered that the parties bear their own legal fees and costs, resulting in a somewhat pyrrhic victory. 87 The interesting aspect here is that the damages for sexual harassment are based on the 2008 Christmas email, with the Court emphasizing that the women had notified the man in May 2008 that they found the picture offensive, this his knowledge of this was proven. This is close to the reasoning in the Blackey case, where the Court found that those persons using such terms had no knowledge they were offensive as the plaintiff had voluntarily participated in the banter. Here the women had notified the man that they found the picture offensive, so that he could not claim that he did not understand the picture could be offensive. The dissenting member of the Court stated that the picture, "against the flow of pictures with nudity and satirical content that today flood Swedish society" cannot be seen as particularly remarkable, and that it was not proven that the sender tried to influence the two women sexually or try to communicate anything sexual. Thus the dissenting member of the Court did not find any sexual harassment had occurred.
Analysis of the case law of the Labour Court through a CRT Lens
Under the burden of proof as set out in the 1999 Ethnic Discrimination Act as well as the current 2008 Discrimination Act, the plaintiff is to show circumstances indicating that unlawful discrimination has occurred, and then the burden of proof is to shift to the employer to prove that no unlawful discrimination has occurred. As can be seen in many of the cases above, when the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that it is word against word, it has found that the plaintiff has not made the necessary showing required for the burden of proof to shift to the employer.
Several aspects can be raised from a Critical Race Perspective as to the judgments in these cases. The first is that of interest convergence, as argued originally by Professor Derrick
Bell with respect to Brown v. Board of Education. In the Swedish context, the argument would run that Sweden adopted its discrimination legislation for many of the same reasons as Another of the original observations of CRT in the American context is also pertinent
here, that issues of discrimination cannot be resolved in the liberal belief of the equal worth of all persons before the law regardless of anything else. The persons before the law in discrimination cases are not identical, but despite this, the Labour Court treats individuals claiming discrimination exactly the same as the employers, despite inequalities with respect to legal and financial resources. In the Blackey case, the employer knew of the racially-tinged banter in the workplace at the same time as it claimed it knew that there were conflicts in the same workplace, but that one was not related to the other. In other words, it was totally plausible to the Labour Court that a workplace could have racially-based "fun" banter at the same time as according to the employer, there were enormous conflicts at that same workplace, and the Labour Court found no cause to impose a duty to investigate on the employer. Another aspect of the banter, in addition to it being banter as the plaintiff consented to it, was whether there was an alternative course of action for the plaintiff that would not have been considered threatening. Even in the most recent case, the Labour Court has required plaintiffs to prove defendant had knowledge as to the offensiveness of the conduct at issue, in essence, heightening the burden of proof in such cases. As seen from the case law The last aspect that can be taken from CRT here is the analysis of the post-racial discourse. As seen from the legislative bill for the 2008 Discrimination Act, the Swedish Parliament has decided that the word "race" is not an appropriate term and is not to be used.
However, there is nothing yet with which this vacuum is to be filled. In addition, without an understanding of race as a social construct, the courts will always be free to find that certain 29 behaviors fall outside of any listing. In addition, as warned by many CRT scholars, taking race out of the discourse glosses over not only the history of its coinage, but also the present state of affairs, and as can be seen from the case law above, is definitely a premature step in 
